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Abstract. We present a threshold secret sharing scheme based on poly-
nomial interpolation and the Die-Hellman problem. In this scheme
shares can be used for the reconstruction of multiple secrets, sharehold-
ers can dynamically join or leave without distributing new shares to the
existing shareholders, and shares can be individually veried during both
share distribution and secret recovery.
1 Introduction
Since Blakley [2] and Shamir [13] introduced the concept of secret sharing in
1979, a number of secret sharing schemes have been proposed with varying prop-
erties meeting diverse application requirements. The basic idea of secret sharing
is that a dealer distributes partial information (a share) about a secret to each
of a set of shareholders such that only authorised subsets of the shareholders
can reconstruct the secret. For the purposes of this paper, the main properties
of interest here are the following.
 Perfect security or computational security. A secret sharing scheme is per-
fectly secure if an unauthorised subset of shareholders can obtain no infor-
mation about the secret [14], and it is computationally secure if it is com-
putationally infeasible to determine the secret from such a subset [8, 16].
 Veriable shares. We consider two kinds of share verication. The rst is
that during share distribution each shareholder can verify his received share
to detect a dishonest or failed dealer [3, 10, 11]. The second is that during
secret reconstruction a forged share contributed by a cheating shareholder
can be detected by the other shareholders [7, 15].
 `Online' shareholders. Shareholders can dynamically join or leave the sharing
group without having to redistribute new shares secretly to the existing
shareholders [1, 4, 12, 13].
 Reusable shares. Shares can be reused after the shared secret has been
reconstructed, although there may be a modication allowing a predeter-
mined number of multiple secrets to be reconstructed in a specied order
[7, 9, 12, 15, 16].
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This paper presents two variants of a new threshold secret sharing scheme
holding the above properties. The mechanism is based on several previously
proposed schemes, namely those of Shamir [13], Pedersen [10], Cachin [4] and
Pinch [12]. We now briey summarise the basic features of these schemes.
Shamir [13] proposed a polynomial interpolation based (t;m)-threshold secret
sharing scheme, in which no group of fewer than t from a set of m shareholders
can obtain any information about a secret, and any group of at least t sharehold-
ers can compute the secret. While keeping t xed, a share can be dynamically
added or deleted without aecting the other shares as long as the total number of
shareholders remaining is at least t. Deleting a share in this context means that
it is made completely inaccessible, even to the owning shareholder. This scheme
does not allow the shares to be reused after the secret has been reconstructed.
Pedersen [10] adds a distributed prover to the Shamir scheme, so that the m
shares (one for each shareholder) can be veried by the m shareholders.
Cachin [4] presents a protocol with `online shareholders', in which each of
a set of shares is chosen randomly. Adding or deleting a share does not aect
the other shares, provided that additional authentic, but not secret, information
is posted in a publicly accessible central location. This proposal also does not
allow multiple use of the shares.
Pinch [12] gives a modication of Cachin's scheme which allows for an arbi-
trary number of secrets to be reconstructed without having to redistribute new
shares.
Both the Cachin and Pinch protocols are designed for general access struc-
tures. The number of authentic messages in a publicly accessible noticeboard is
proportional to the number of minimal shareholder sets trusted to recover the
secret. If this trusted set number is large, a large noticeboard will be needed. In
particular, a (t;m)-threshold scheme is an important special case of a general
access structure, where the trusted shareholder sets are all combinations of the
m shareholders taken t at a time, of which there are
 
m
t

, which is of order m
t
for t small relative to m. Thus, when using the Cachin or the Pinch scheme to
implement (t,m)-threshold secret sharing, a potentially large public noticeboard
of size
 
m
t

must be maintained.
In this paper we modify the Pinch scheme to obtain a threshold secret shar-
ing scheme by using a reusable polynomial function. The main advantage of
the new scheme is that a large noticeboard is not required. In addition, this
mechanism makes use of publicly accessible provers to give the property of share
verication: i.e., each share is veriable during both share distribution and secret
reconstruction.
2 Notation and assumptions
Let p and q be large primes such that q divides p 1. Let G be the additive group
of integers modulo p, and let M be a subgroup of order q of the multiplicative
group of non-zero integers modulo p (and hence, since q is prime, M will be
cyclic). Let g be a generator of M , and h : M ! G be a one-way function
such that it is computationally infeasible to recover x from y = h(x). These
parameters will be used throughout this paper.
Suppose that inM the Die-Hellman problem [6] is intractable: that is, given
elements g, g
x
and g
y
in M and the modulus p, it is computationally infeasible
to obtain g
xy
. This implies in particular the intractability of the corresponding
discrete logarithm problem: i.e. given g and g
x
in M and p it is computationally
infeasible to recover the exponent x.
All protocols in this paper are carried out between a dealer D and a set of
shareholders P = fP
1
; :::; P
m
g. We suppose that the communication channels
between D and the m shareholders provide origin authentication and data in-
tegrity for the retrieval of noticeboard information. The above parameters, p, q,
g, h, G and M , are publicly known to D and P .
3 Outline of the Pinch scheme
In this protocol, certain subsets X  P are trusted to recover the secret K. The
family of minimal trusted sets is denoted as   . The protocol makes use of a
noticeboard where messages can be written by D and read by all shareholders.
D initiates the protocol by randomly choosing secret shares s
i
(1  i  m),
integers satisfying 1 < s
i
< q, for each shareholder P
i
and then transmits s
i
secretly to P
i
. Alternatively, D and P
i
engage in a key-exchange protocol such
as Die-Hellman [6] to exchange a suitable s
i
.
For each minimal trusted set X 2   , D randomly chooses g
X
, a generator of
M , then computes
T
X
= K   h(g
Q
x2X
s
x
X
) (mod p);
and posts the pair (g
X
, T
X
) on the noticeboard.
To recover the secret K, a minimal trusted set X of shareholders comes
together (without loss of generality suppose X = fP
1
; :::; P
t
g). They form
U
X
= g
Q
t
i=1
s
i
X
= g
Q
x2X
s
x
X
(mod p)
via a chain from P
1
to P
t
: i.e., each shareholder P
i
contributes his secret share
s
i
as a power. Finally P
t
obtains U
X
and then reconstructs K as
K = T
X
+ h(U
X
) (mod p):
Note that in this scheme shares are not revealed during secret reconstruction,
and h(U
X
) is a fresh value given a fresh g
X
. However, the one-way function h
and the shares can be reused for an arbitrary number of secrets reconstructed
by dierent trusted sets, provided that D posts a fresh pair (g
X
; T
X
) on the
noticeboard for each secret and for each particular trusted minimal set.
As mentioned earlier, the disadvantage of this scheme is that it needs a large
noticeboard when   is a big family. In particular, if this protocol is used to
implement (t, m)-threshold secret sharing, then the number of elements in  
is
 
m
t

, which grows very quickly and which is of the order of m
t
for m large
relative to t. In the next section we present a modication of this protocol, based
on a reusable polynomial, to provide a threshold scheme which does not need a
large noticeboard.
4 A new secret sharing scheme
We present two versions of a new scheme with dierent requirements for the
handling of invalidated shares. The rst version works on the assumption either
that the shareholders are trusted not to use a share that has been invalidated,
or that invalidated shares are completely deleted. The second version does not
rely on this assumption.
4.1 Version 1
Let s (an element of Z
q
) be a `long term secret', which is shared by the m
shareholders. Let K (an element of Z
q
) be a `short term secret', which will be
reconstructed by any group of at least t (t  m) shareholders. The shares of s
can be used for the reconstruction of multiple `short term secrets'.
D initially distributes partial information (a share) about s to each of the
m shareholders, in a way based on the Shamir scheme [13] and the Pedersen
scheme [10].
D chooses a degree t  1 polynomial
f(x) = a
0
+ a
1
x+ :::+ a
t 1
x
t 1
overZ
q
satisfying a
0
= s, and computes each share s
i
= f(x
i
) (1  i  m). Here
x
i
2Z
q
  f0g (x
i
6= x
j
, for i 6= j) is public information about P
i
. D then sends
the share s
i
secretly to P
i
and broadcasts a verication sequence
V = (g
a
0
; g
a
1
; :::; g
a
t 1
);
each value computed modulo p, to all m shareholders.
Each P
i
computes
v
i
=
t 1
Y
j=0
(g
a
j
)
(x
i
)
j
(mod p);
and veries whether
v
i
= g
s
i
(mod p):
If this does not hold then P
i
broadcasts s
i
and stops. Otherwise P
i
accepts the
share.
Note that there are a number of cryptographic techniques to distribute shares,
e.g. Sun and Shieh [15] use the Die-Hellman scheme [6] to do so.
For each `short term secret' K, D chooses a random nonce r 2 Z
q
(which
must be used only once and cannot be predicted in advance or guessed in the
future by any shareholders or intercepting third parties), and then broadcasts
g
r
, T
r
and another verication sequence V
r
to all m shareholders, where
T
r
= K   h(g
rs
) (mod p);
and
V
r
= (g
g
rs
1
; :::; g
g
rs
m
);
each value computed modulo p.
To recover the secret K, any t shareholders (without loss of generality suppose
they are P
1
, ..., P
t
) join together. Each shareholder P
i
(1  i  t) computes and
contributes to all other shareholders g
rs
i
. Based on V
r
, each contribution can
individually be veried by the other shareholders. After all the contributions
have been checked successfully, the t shareholders each compute g
rs
i
b
i
, where
b
i
=
t
Y
j=1
j 6=i
x
j
x
j
  x
i
(mod q):
They then form
g
rs
= g
rs
1
b
1
+:::+rs
t
b
t
=
t
Y
i=1
g
rs
i
b
i
(mod p);
and reconstruct the secret K as
K = T
r
+ h(g
rs
) (mod p):
Note that the polynomial f , one-way hash function h, `long term secret' s
and shares s
i
(1  i  m) can all be reused for recovering multiple `short term
secrets', provided that D broadcasts the fresh values of g
r
, T
r
and V
r
for each
new `short term secret'.
We make the following remarks concerning the above protocol.
 In order to allow shareholders to join and leave dynamically, we must assume
that any deleted shares will no longer be acceptable for the reconstruction
of any secret. If a shareholder were to leave and his share were to become
known to another shareholder (or a third party), then a threshold of only t 1
shareholders (possibly with the help of that third party) could reconstruct
a `short term secret' by using the invalidated share with their t   1 valid
shares. The above protocol requires either that the shareholders are trusted
not to use a share that has been invalidated, that invalidated shares are
completely deleted, or that there is some (physical) constraint on the shares
to ensure that invalidated shares cannot be accepted for the reconstruction
of any secret.
 The whole point of (t, m)-threshold secret sharing is that any t or more
shareholders are collectively trustworthy. In this protocol, it is assumed that
as soon as any t or more shareholders are no longer considered trustworthy,
D must terminate use of the polynomial. Although this is not an unrea-
sonable assumption, there may be some application environments where D
wants to continue to use the polynomial after deleting a group of t or more
untrustworthy shareholders.
In the next subsection we will present a modied version, that can avoid the
possibility of reduction of the threshold when some shares are invalidated, and
that can be used under the condition of at most a predetermined number of
shares having been invalidated.
4.2 Version 2
In this version, we make use of a degree t+u  1 polynomial instead of a degree
t   1 one. Let u be an upper bound for the number of the shares that can be
deleted by D without compromising the shared secrets.
To distribute shares of s, D chooses a degree t+ u  1 polynomial
f(x) = a
0
+ a
1
x+ :::+ a
t+u 1
x
t+u 1
overZ
q
satisfying a
0
= s (`long term secret'), and computes each share s
i
= f(x
i
)
(1  i  m + u). Here x
i
2 Z
q
  f0g (x
i
6= x
j
, for i 6= j) is public information.
The element x
i+u
is publicly associated with shareholder P
i
. D then secretly
stores the u shares s
1
, ..., s
u
and sends the remaining shares s
u+i
(1  i  m) to
P
i
(1  i  m), one for each shareholder. After that, D broadcasts a verication
sequence
V = (g
a
0
; g
a
1
; :::; g
a
t+u 1
);
each value computed modulo p, to all m shareholders.
Each P
i
computes
v
i
=
t+u 1
Y
j=0
(g
a
j
)
(x
u+i
)
j
(mod p);
and veries whether
v
i
= g
s
u+i
(mod p):
If this does not hold then P
i
broadcasts s
u+i
and stops. Otherwise P
i
accepts
the share.
For each `short term secret' K, D chooses a random nonce r 2 Z
q
(as men-
tioned before, it must be used only once and cannot be predicted in advance or
guessed in the future by any shareholders or intercepting third parties). D then
distributes some public information in one of two dierent ways depending on
whether any shares are invalidated.
When no share is invalidated, D broadcasts g
r
, W
r
, T
r
and V
r
to all m
shareholders, where
W
r
= (g
rs
1
; :::; g
rs
u
);
each value computed modulo p;
T
r
= K   h(g
rs
) (mod p);
and
V
r
= (g
g
rs
u+1
; :::; g
g
rs
u+m
);
each value computed modulo p.
The secret shares s
1
; s
2
; :::; s
u
kept by D serve as placeholders for shares that
may be invalidated in the future. In case a share, s
u+i
(1  i  m), has to
be invalidated, one of the secret shares will be dismissed and replaced by the
invalidated share. More precisely, assume that L (1  L  u) shares, say s
0
1
, ...,
s
0
L
in s
u+1
, ..., s
u+m
, are invalidated. D replaces s
1
, ..., s
L
with these invalid
shares and uses these values in the computation of W
r
. D then broadcasts g
r
,
W
r
, T
r
, V
r
(without g
g
rs
0
1
, ..., g
g
rs
0
L
) and the corresponding variables x
0
1
, ..., x
0
L
which have replaced x
1
, ..., x
L
, i.e. the positions of the invalidated shares.
To recover the secret K, any t shareholders, say P
1
, ..., P
t
, join together.
Each shareholder P
i
(1  i  t) computes and contributes to all other share-
holders g
rs
u+i
. Based on V
r
, each contribution is then individually veried by
the other shareholders. After all the contributions are checked successfully, these
t shareholders compute g
rs
i
b
i
(1  i  t+ u), where
b
i
=
t+u
Y
j=1
j 6=i
x
j
x
j
  x
i
(mod q):
They then form
g
rs
=
t+u
Y
i=1
g
rs
i
b
i
(mod p);
and reconstruct the secret K as
K = T
r
+ h(g
rs
) (mod p):
We make the following remarks concerning the above protocol.
 The choice of the value u is dependent on the application requirements.
We here consider two possible conditions aecting the choice of u. The rst
requires that the number of the shares currently valid at any time during
the working of the scheme will not be less than t. In this case, the upper
bound on the value u is m
0
  t, where m
0
is the number of valid shares at
the beginning of the scheme. The second requires that the possible number
of invalidated shares must never be larger than u as long as the number of
valid shares remaining is at least t. In this case, the lower bound on the value
u is m
00
  t, where m
00
is an upper bound for the total number of the shares
issued by D to P . Note that the complexity of computation of a secret in
this version will grow quickly when the value u becomes very large. Thus in
practice, u would be set at an appropriate level for the application, and the
scheme re-initialised should the number of invalidated shares exceed u.
 It is clear that if an authorised group (t or more) of shareholders do not fol-
low the protocol specications correctly, the protocol will fail. For example,
if they reveal their shares to each other, then each member has access to the
secret equivalent to that of the authorised subgroup. In particular, an autho-
rised group of t shareholders, say P
1
, P
2
, ..., P
t
, can pool their secrets and
calculate a value s
0
=
P
t
i=1
b
i
s
i
, which each one can use to calculate a `short
term secret' (using only public information) when D makes a broadcast.
5 Analysis of the new scheme
The security of the scheme. The proposed scheme has the following security prop-
erties.
1. By using precisely the same arguments as used to prove the corresponding
statements for the Shamir scheme, we can show that the scheme meets the
basic requirements for (t;m)-threshold secret sharing: i.e., during the recon-
struction of a `short term secret' no group of fewer than t shareholders can
obtain any information about g
rs
, and any t shareholders can compute this
value.
2. By using precisely the same arguments as used to prove the corresponding
statements for the Pinch scheme, we can show that the `short term secrets'
are computationally secure, assuming the intractability of the Die-Hellman
problem in M . The use of the one-way function h ensures that no attack
based on the multiplicative property of the group M will succeed.
Shareholder addition/deletion. Based on polynomial interpolation, this scheme
allows shareholders to be dynamically added or deleted without having to re-
distribute new shares secretly to the existing shareholders. If a shareholder, say
P
l
, enters, D sends s
l
(for Version 1) and s
u+l
(for Version 2) secretly to P
l
and informs all shareholders about x
l
(for Version 1) and x
u+l
(for Version 2).
As mentioned in the protocol description, Version 1 works on the assumption
(without a physical solution) that any deleted shares will no longer be acceptable
for the reconstruction of any secret. Version 2 does not rely on this assumption,
but makes use of a disenrollment scheme that allows at most u shareholders to
quit without aecting the other shares while maintaining the threshold value
t. During dynamic changes to the set of shareholders, in Version 1, D shares a
`short term secret' as before, and in Version 2, D only needs to compute renewed
values of W
r
by using the renewed shares. However, in the Cachin protocol and
the Pinch protocol, D has to re-post the pair (g
X
, T
X
) for each new minimal
trusted set X involving any added and deleted shareholders on the noticeboard.
For a detailed discussion on threshold schemes with disenrollment, the reader
is referred to [1]. Charnes, Pieprzyk and Safavi-Naini [5] propose a secret sharing
scheme with disenrollment capability. Although sharing only a single secret, their
scheme uses the idea of `initial conditions' which are converted to working shares
by exponentiation of a primitive element. If a working share is invalidated then
a new set of working shares is created by distributing a new primitive element.
They make use of a combiner to maintain the reconstruction of the secret. To
cope with the possibility that an `initial condition' may be compromised they
propose using a family of secret sharing schemes. A dealer selects and contributes
l independent Shamir threshold schemes to n shareholders. The reconstruction
of a secret starts by using the rst threshold scheme. If an `initial condition'
in the rst threshold scheme is compromised, all the shareholders switch to a
new threshold scheme. In a similar way to the scheme proposed in this paper,
the Charnes et al. method can tolerate the loss of a specied number of shares.
However it is not suitable for the case where a number of shareholders can quit
and then all of the shares held by them may be compromised.
Polynomial reuse. If t is kept xed, this scheme allows multiple use of the
polynomial f , because no polynomial value is revealed during secret reconstruc-
tion.
Suppose a hierarchical access scheme is required, i.e. some shareholders are
allowed to have greater rights to access a secret than the other shareholders.
We can use the same polynomial of degree t  1 for Version 1 and t + u  1 for
Version 2, but let some shareholders hold more than one share, as is suggested
by Shamir [13].
In Version 2, as soon as more than u shares of a polynomial are expected
to be invalid (e.g., when the corresponding shareholders will leave), D must
terminate use of the polynomial in order to prevent an unauthorised group from
reconstructing a secret by using unauthorised shares.
Share verication. The scheme makes use of two verication sequences (V and
V
r
) so that each share can be veried when it is accepted by a shareholder as his
private share and when it is contributed by the shareholder for reconstructing
a secret. Assuming the intractability of the Die-Hellman problem, these two
sequences will not compromise the security of shares.
Sun and Shieh [15] propose a polynomial based secret sharing scheme with
share verication by broadcasting a verication sequence, in which the Die-
Hellman scheme is used to distribute shares. This protocol does not allow mul-
tiple use of a polynomial, i.e., for each renewed secret D has to choose a new
polynomial. As Hwang and Chang point out [7], it is dicult for D to construct
many polynomials with the same degree t  1 such that all the polynomial val-
ues are fresh. Furthermore, it will result in a weakness of the protocol, namely
that by comparing an old share with each value of a current verication se-
quence, a shareholder may nd that he holds more than one valid share. Hwang
and Chang then propose a modication to improve the share verication tech-
nique, but again, their protocol does not allow multiple use of a polynomial.
The scheme proposed in this paper has no such problem. The reason is that not
many polynomials with the same order and the same variables are needed.
Other properties. It is easy to see that this scheme has the following further
properties. Each share is the same size as one of the secrets. The number of
`short term secrets' which can be reconstructed by reusing a single polynomial is
only limited to the number of fresh values r. Because the values r are randomly
chosen in Z
q
, the number of possible choices can be very large. The new scheme
broadcasts of the order of m elements whereas the Cachin and Pinch schemes
require a noticeboard of size
 
m
t

to implement (t;m)-threshold secret sharing.
6 Conclusions
We have proposed a new (t, m)-threshold secret sharing scheme which permits
the reconstruction of multiple secrets and dynamic changes to the set of share-
holders without distributing new shares to current members of the scheme, and
which allows the verication of individual shares during the share distribution
and secret reconstruction.
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